Two general classifications of theoretical explanations for concreteness effects are evaluated. Process theories are those that emphasize the nature of the processing initiated by the study items, and structural explanations are those that emphasize the role of long-term memory representations of the study items. A series of four experiments is presented in which structural variables such as the number of associates a word has in long-term memory (set size) and the density of the connections among those associates (connectivity) are crossed with concreteness under several different instructional manipulations in the cued recall task. The results consistently demonstrate that concreteness effects and effects related to the associative structure of the study items are not dependent upon one another, but instead have additive effects on performance. The results allow for the elimination of the structural explanations, in favor of one of the process theories: dual code theory. The results are also consistent with the overall framework of memory proposed by the PIER model. © 1999 Academic Press Over the past 30 years, the concreteness effect has been one of the most robust findings in the memory literature (see Paivio, 1991 , for a review). Word concreteness refers to the extent to which one can readily form a mental image of a word's referent, and it is measured by asking subjects to rate words on a numerical scale (Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968; Toglia & Battig, 1978) . The concreteness effect refers to the finding that concrete words have an advantage over abstract words in recall (Marschark & Paivio, 1977) , recognition (Begg & Paivio, 1969) , lexical decision (Bleasdale, 1987; Schwanenflugel, Harnishfeger, & Stowe 1988 ), pronunciation (de Groot, 1989, and comprehension (Holmes & Langford, 1976; Moeser, 1974; Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983) . The purpose of the current study was to evaluate an alternative explanation of the concreteness effect, but first we will briefly examine some of the existing explanations.
Over the past 30 years, the concreteness effect has been one of the most robust findings in the memory literature (see Paivio, 1991 , for a review). Word concreteness refers to the extent to which one can readily form a mental image of a word's referent, and it is measured by asking subjects to rate words on a numerical scale (Paivio, Yuille, & Madigan, 1968; Toglia & Battig, 1978) . The concreteness effect refers to the finding that concrete words have an advantage over abstract words in recall (Marschark & Paivio, 1977) , recognition (Begg & Paivio, 1969) , lexical decision (Bleasdale, 1987; Schwanenflugel, Harnishfeger, & Stowe 1988 ), pronunciation (de Groot, 1989 , and comprehension (Holmes & Langford, 1976; Moeser, 1974; Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983) . The purpose of the current study was to evaluate an alternative explanation of the concreteness effect, but first we will briefly examine some of the existing explanations.
Several theories have been developed over the years to explain concreteness effects. Those theories can be broadly organized into two general classifications; process theories and structural theories. For the present purposes, process theories are those that emphasize the nature of the processing that is initiated by study items. Structural theories, on the other hand, attribute concreteness effects to differences in the under-lying long-term memory representation of these items. What follows is a brief discussion of some examples of process and structural theories, but this discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive listing.
An example process theory, Dual Code Theory (DCT), is arguably the most prominent explanation of concreteness effects (Paivio, 1971 (Paivio, , 1983 (Paivio, , 1986 (Paivio, , 1991 . According to DCT, there are two distinct coding processes, a verbal or linguistic code and a nonverbal or imaginal code. Concrete information is assumed to be stored in both codes because concrete words, by definition, are easy to imagine, whereas abstract words are stored primarily in the verbal code because they are more difficult to imagine. DCT assumes that, at retrieval, the availability of two codes for the concrete material relative to only one code for the abstract material is responsible for producing the relative advantage of concrete words over abstract words.
There has been some disagreement in the literature as to how well DCT explains concreteness effects under various conditions. For example, Wattenmaker and Shoben (1987) discuss several reasons for questioning the utility of DCT's explanation of the concreteness effect. The strongest of their claims is that, although the concreteness effect occurs commonly in the absence of encoding context, the effect tends to disappear when materials are integrated with conceptually related material (Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Bransford & McCarrell, 1974; Pezdek & Royer, 1974) . For example, Schwanenflugel and Shoben (1983) demonstrated that when presented in a sentence context, lexical decision times were not significantly different for concrete relative to abstract words. However, when presented in isolation, concrete words were processed faster than abstract words.
Another processing theory, the RelationalDistinctive (R-D) processing framework, has also been formulated to explain concreteness effects. This framework was originally proposed by Humphreys (1978) , tested by Einstein & Hunt (1980; Hunt & Einstein, 1981) , and later modified and extended by Marschark and colleagues (Marschark & Hunt, 1989; Marschark & Surian, 1992; Marschark, Richman, Yuille, & Hunt, 1987) . According to the R-D framework, concreteness effects are due to the kinds of processing occurring at encoding, not the number of codes (i.e., verbal vs imaginal) associated with the target stimuli. Recall depends upon encoding relationships among the targets as a set and on encoding distinctive attributes of the targets themselves. According to Humphreys (1978) , performance is best when both relational and distinctive information are readily available. The R-D framework posits that, at retrieval, the relational information defines the search set, while the distinctive information allows the target to be selected from among the other items. Essentially, the concreteness effect reflects the enhanced distinctiveness or discriminability of items that have received imaginal processing (concrete items), relative to those items that do not receive this enhanced discriminability (abstract items).
The R-D framework has also met with some difficulties in explaining concreteness effects. For example, Ruiz-Vargas, Cuevas, & Marschark (1996, p. 48) have argued that, according to the R-D framework, the concreteness effect should be attenuated or eliminated in tasks that reduce or eliminate relational processing, such as ". . .in cued recall tasks that involve only a single list presentation, or when access to relational information is blocked (e.g., with extralist recall cues)." They presented a series of three experiments that provide evidence that is inconsistent with the R-D framework. The concreteness effect was found to be reliable in the extralist cued recall task in each of their experiments. Paivio (1991) also presents several reasons for questioning the utility of the R-D framework. Paivio's strongest argument is that the R-D framework predicts that the concreteness effect will be absent in free recall in the absence of relational processing. Marschark and Hunt (1989) found no effect in this situation, but Paivio and Walsh (1991) and Ruiz-Vargas, et al. (1996) present counterevidence.
Although both examples of the process theories can explain some of the data, they do not appear to offer a complete explanation for all of the data. Therefore, we will now focus attention on some structural explanations of the concreteness effect. An example of a structural theory is the Contextual Variety Hypothesis (Galbraith & Underwood, 1973; Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983) . According to this hypothesis, concrete words have fewer weakly related associates stored with them in long-term memory because they appear in fewer linguistic contexts than do abstract words . The fundamental assumption is that comprehension requires the retrieval of associated information from memory, and because concrete words have fewer weakly related associates than abstract words, comprehension occurs faster for concrete relative to abstract words (presumably because the search set is smaller for concrete relative to abstract words), and thus they show an advantage in various tasks.
Another structural explanation represents an opposing view to the Contextual Variety Hypothesis, and it was discussed by de Groot (1989) . de Groot argued that the concept nodes of concrete words have more information than those of abstract words, and this is the reason that concrete words have an advantage over abstract words in various tasks. In essence, this position is the opposite of the Contextual Variety Hypothesis, which stipulates that concrete words have fewer associates in long-term memory than abstract words. This perspective, termed the Perceptual Associates Hypothesis by , stipulates that concrete words have more associates in longterm memory than abstract words.
The Contextual Variety Hypothesis and Perceptual Associates Hypothesis have also met with some criticism. presented evidence that, they argue, is not adequately explained by either of these two perspectives. classified both of these approaches as structural explanations, where the Contextual Variety Hypothesis assumes that concrete words have smaller sets of preexisting associates than abstract words, and the Perceptual Associates Hypothesis assumes that concrete words have larger sets of preexisting associates than abstract words. Both of these approaches assume that the underlying associative set size of the target word is responsible for producing the concreteness effect. However, demonstrated that target set size and concreteness effects are independent and parallel in nature. also suggested an alternative structural explanation of their findings. Concrete words may be easier to remember because there may be more connections among their preexisting associates than among the associates of abstract words. In other words, it is possible that the associative networks of concrete words are more densely interconnected than are the associative networks of abstract words. Previous research has shown that cued recall performance is facilitated when the targets have highly interconnected sets of associates relative to when the sets of associates are more sparsely interconnected (Nelson, Bennett, Gee, Schreiber, & McKinney, 1993) . This finding is referred to as the connectivity effect. Essentially, suggested the possibility that the connectivity effect may underlie the concreteness effect. The purpose of the series of experiments presented here is to evaluate this alternative structural hypothesis, which we will refer to as the Connectivity Hypothesis.
Connectivity effects and other effects related to the associative structure of words have been explained via the Processing Implicit and Explicit Representations (PIER, and more recently PIER-2) model (Nelson, Schreiber, & McEvoy, 1992; Nelson, McKinney, Gee, & Janczura, 1998) . PIER does not predict the Connectivity Hypothesis, but it has been developed to explain the effects of structural differences of words in various memory tasks. Essentially, PIER distinguishes between two independent components of processing. The implicit component involves the automatic activation of related associates connected to the target word as a result of previous experience. The resulting implicit representation consists of the target and its associates, where the target receives a higher level of activation in long-term working memory than the associates. The explicit component involves intentional processing activities directed toward the target words, such as activities involving elaboration of the study items, or following instructions to rehearse, generate images, or rate pleasantness or imageability. PIER assumes that the implicit and explicit representations leave independent traces and that the sampling process that occurs at retrieval has a variable probability of recovering one or the other or both traces (Nelson et al., 1998) .
The PIER model does not attempt to explain the occurrence of concreteness effects, but it does attribute them to the influence of the explicit representation because of the ease of attachment of contextual information to concrete relative to abstract words (Wattenmaker & Shoben, 1987) or to the use of imagery as a form of elaborative processing . However, effects related to the associative structure of the target words, such as the set size effect or connectivity effects, are attributed to the influence of the implicit representation. Therefore, according to the PIER model, the concreteness effect should be independent of target set size and connectivity effects because they are attributed to independent underlying representations. The Connectivity Hypothesis and PIER make opposing predictions regarding the roles of concreteness and connectivity in cued recall performance. The Connectivity Hypothesis stipulates that connectivity underlies concreteness, whereas PIER predicts that these two variables will have independent effects in cued recall. Therefore, these two approaches were used to guide the following research and each was evaluated based on the experimental outcomes. The other structural and process theories will be discussed where appropriate.
EXPERIMENT 1
This experiment was designed to examine the effect of target concreteness (concrete vs abstract), target connectivity (high vs low), and target set size (small vs large) under two different kinds of experimental instructions. By including target concreteness and connectivity as variables in the same experiment, we can test the Connectivity Hypothesis that concrete words are more easily recalled because they have more highly interconnected sets of associates than do abstract words. This hypothesis predicts an interaction involving concreteness and connectivity, such that the concreteness effect should be more apparent when connectivity is high and less apparent when connectivity is low. Alternatively, PIER's prediction that concreteness and connectivity have additive effects in cued recall can also be evaluated. PIER predicts main effects for both variables and no interaction between the two.
In addition to concreteness and connectivity, this experiment also included a set size manipulation. demonstrated that set size and concreteness have independent effects in the cued recall task. The set size variable is included to provide an important point of replication and to test predictions based on PIER. Thus, two main effects were predicted such that words with small sets of associates and concrete words were predicted to be associated with higher levels of recall than words with large sets of associates and abstract words. An interaction between concreteness and target set size would be inconsistent with predictions based on PIER.
Finally, an instructional manipulation was included to examine the impact of imagery on cued recall performance. Subjects were asked to remember as many of the study words as possible, or they were asked to rate the imageability of the target words as they appeared at study. According to PIER, the explicit representation is enhanced by intentional processing activities directed toward the target words, such as generating images. Therefore, PIER predicts that performance should be higher in the rate imageability condition than in the standard instructional condition. This prediction is based on the assumption that subjects were generating images as a way of rating the imageability of the study items.
Method
Design. The experimental design formed a 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 mixed-model factorial. Instructions (standard or rate imageability) and concreteness (concrete or abstract words) were manipulated between subjects while target set size (small vs large) and connectivity (high vs low) were manipulated within subjects. The depen-dent measure was accuracy of cued recall performance.
Participants. Twenty subjects were randomly assigned to each between subjects condition, so that a total of 80 subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects were undergraduates in the introductory psychology courses at the University of South Florida and they received course credit for their participation.
Materials. The test cues and their related targets appear in Appendix A. All of the words used in this series of experiments were drawn from a database of single response association norms that is currently in development (for a description see . These normative data allow us to control or to simultaneously manipulate many word characteristics. For example, the 24 targets used in each list in this experiment consisted of equal numbers of words with small or large associative sets and high or low connectivity. Two lists of abstract words and two lists of concrete words were used. When pooled over lists, concreteness ratings averaged 5.85 (SD ϭ 0.55) for concrete words and 3.49 (SD ϭ 0.71) for abstract words; target set size averaged 6.65 (SD ϭ 1.23) for words with small sets of associates and 20.58 (SD ϭ 2.66) for words with large sets of associates; connectivity values averaged 0.97 (SD ϭ 0.50) for words with low levels of connectivity and 2.13 (SD ϭ 0.55) for words with high levels of connectivity. Connectivity values were calculated by taking the total number of connections among the associates of the target and dividing by target set size. In large sets, there are more available slots for connections to occur than there are in small sets, but dividing by the set size of the target functions to factor target set size out of the equation. For example, the word DINNER has five associates; supper, eat, lunch, food, and meal (this example is drawn from Nelson et al., 1993) . There are 17 connections among these associates (e.g., supper is connected to lunch, eat is connected to food, etc.); therefore the connectivity value for the word DINNER would be 17/5 ϭ 3.40. In contrast, the word DOG also has five associates; cat, puppy, animal, house, and friend, but there is only one connection among these associates (animal is connected to cat). Therefore, the connectivity value of DOG (1/5 ϭ 0.20) is much lower than that of DINNER.
The test cues that were used to prompt recall were also drawn from the same normative source and were selected based on their cue-totarget strength, meaning set size, and concreteness. When pooled over lists, the average cueto-target strength was 0.16 (SD ϭ 0.07), the average cue set size was 13.33 (SD ϭ 4.37), and the average cue concreteness was 4.67 (SD ϭ 1.18). In general, the cues were moderately related to their targets, defined medium sets of associates, and were moderately concrete.
Each of the above word characteristics were also controlled on a condition by condition basis. Concrete targets had an average set size of 13.17 (SD ϭ 7.06) and an average connectivity value of 1.53 (SD ϭ 0.57). Abstract targets had an average set size of 14.05 (SD ϭ 7.69) and an average connectivity value of 1.57 (SD ϭ 0.49). Low connectivity targets had an average concreteness rating of 4.69 (SD ϭ 0.69) and an average set size of 13.42 (SD ϭ 7.00). High connectivity targets had an average concreteness value of 4.55 (SD ϭ 0.68) and an average set size of 13.80 (SD ϭ 7.74). Small set size words had an average concreteness value of 4.54 (SD ϭ 0.63) and an average connectivity value of 1.31 (SD ϭ 0.39). Large set size words had an average concreteness value of 4.69 (SD ϭ 0.73) and an average connectivity value of 1.79 (SD ϭ 0.48).
Procedure. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the between subjects conditions and to one of two lists, such that the experiment was conducted in randomized blocks. Each subject participated in an individual session and received a single study-test trial. The experimenter read the study and test instructions (either standard or rate imageability) to the subjects at the appropriate times during the course of the experiment. Under the standard instructional conditions, subjects were instructed to learn the words at study because their memory for the words would be tested later, but they were not told how their memory would be tested. Under the rate imageability conditions, subjects were asked to rate on a scale of 1 (easy) to 7 (hard) how readily they would be able to form an image of a given study word. No mention was made of an ensuing memory test. During study, the subjects read the 24 words aloud as they were randomly presented on a Kodak slide projector at a 3-s rate. All items were typed in uppercase letters and back projected onto a screen in front of the subject. Immediately following the presentation of the last study item, the experimenter read the test instructions to the subjects. They were told that, on each test trial, they would be presented with a word that was meaningfully related to one of the words in the study list and that their task was to read this cue word aloud and try to recall the study word related in meaning to the test cue. The test cues were self-paced and presented in a different random order than the study words. No subject participated in this experiment more than one time, nor did they participate in any of the other experiments reported in this paper.
Results and Discussion
A four-way mixed-model factorial ANOVA was conducted on the data, and as can be seen from Table 1 , effects due to study instructions, concreteness, connectivity, and set size were all present. An ␣ level of p Ͻ .05 was used as the criterion for significance in all analyses reported in this paper. The typical concreteness effect was reliable in this experiment (F(1,76) ϭ 8.37) such that the proportion of concrete words (M ϭ .62, SD ϭ .21) recalled was significantly higher than abstract words (M ϭ .53, SD ϭ .23). The connectivity effect was also reliable in this experiment, F(1,76) ϭ 8.23. Words with more highly interconnected sets of associates (M ϭ .61, SD ϭ .23) were associated with a higher proportion of recall than words with more sparsely interconnected sets of associates (M ϭ .54, SD ϭ .21). This experiment also replicated the typical target set size effect (F(1,76) ϭ 36.60) such that words with small sets of associates were better recalled (M ϭ .63, SD ϭ .21) than words with large sets of associates (M ϭ .52, SD ϭ .23). Finally, the main effect of instructional condition (F(1,76) ϭ 8.37) revealed that subjects in the rate imageability instructional condition (M ϭ .61, SD ϭ .21) recalled more words than their counterparts in the standard instructional condition (M ϭ .53, SD ϭ .24).
The critical interaction between connectivity and concreteness was not reliable in this experiment (F(1,76) ϭ 1.99, MSe ϭ 3.00, p ϭ .16). In fact, the ordering of the means was in the opposite direction from that of the predicted interaction. Although this interaction was not significant, the effect of concreteness was actually larger in the low connectivity condition (concrete ϭ 0.60 vs abstract ϭ 0.48) than in the high connectivity condition (concrete ϭ 0.63 vs abstract ϭ 0.58). Additionally, a power analysis was conducted to determine whether there was enough power in the experimental design to detect the interaction if it were real. Using standards set by Cohen regarding effect size (Cohen, 1988) , the average within cell standard deviation in this experiment, and the 20 subjects per cell used in this experiment, the resulting power values were (1) for a large effect size (0.80) power was calculated at a perfect 1.00, (2) for a medium effect size (0.50) power was calculated at 0.99, and (3) for a small effect size (0.20) power was calculated at 0.41. Since it doesn't make sense to calculate the effect size of an interaction having means ordered in the wrong direction, the effect size of the concreteness main effect (0.42) was used as an estimate of the effect size for the interaction. The resulting power value was 0.96. Based on this analysis it seems that the experimental design did have enough power to detect the presence of the interaction if it were real. Additionally, the interaction between target set size and connectivity was significant, F(1,76) ϭ 6.67. As can be seen in Fig. 1 , the magnitude of the target set size effect was greater when connectivity was high relative to when connectivity was low. This finding replicates earlier research on the connectivity effect (Nelson et al., 1993) . However, because this interaction is not very relevant to the focus of this paper, it will be briefly discussed later.
No other effects were significant ( p Ͼ .05). The two-way interactions between instruction and concreteness (1,76) ϭ 1.29, ns), instruction and set size (F(1,76) ϭ 1.07, ns), and set size and concreteness (F(1,76) ϭ 1.85, ns) were all nonsignificant. The three-way interaction among set size, connectivity, and concreteness (F(1,76) ϭ 3.60, ns) and the four-way interaction (F(1,76) ϭ 2.58, ns) were also nonsignificant. The interactions between set size, concreteness, and instruction; connectivity and instruction; connectivity, concreteness, and instruction; and set size, connectivity, and instruction all had F's Ͻ 1.0.
The pattern of results present in this experiment suggests that the concreteness effect is independent of connectivity and set size. The Connectivity Hypothesis, that the concreteness effect is produced by underlying network interconnectivity, is not supported by these data. The Connectivity Hypothesis predicted an interaction between concreteness and connectivity that was not demonstrated in the data. However, the PIER model predicted main effects for concreteness and connectivity, and a reliable interaction between these two variables would have been inconsistent with predictions based on PIER. Therefore, the data are consistent with the PIER model but not the Connectivity Hypothesis.
The presence of main effects for concreteness and target set size and the absence of an interaction between the two variables replicates earlier findings and is also consistent with predictions based on PIER. These results appear to be consistent with the claim made by that the concreteness effect does not appear to be produced by the underlying associative set size of concrete vs abstract words. Although the PIER model does not offer an explanation of the concreteness effect, it does provide a framework which indicates that the underlying associative structure of concrete and abstract words is not responsible for producing the effect.
EXPERIMENT 2
The purpose of this experiment was to examine the generalizability of the concreteness effect, the connectivity effect, and the target set size effect under another instructional manipulation involving a different set of experimental stimuli. It is important to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1 given that the Connectivity Hypothesis predicted an interaction that was nonsignificant in that experiment. Thus, new lists, new subjects, and new instructions were utilized in this experiment.
The new instructional condition required subjects to form sentences rather than generate images. In Experiment 1, both sets of instructions either allowed subjects to purposefully or automatically generate images. Here, although no claim is made that the subjects do not automatically generate images, subjects are encouraged to focus on the verbal encoding of the information at study. It is possible that underlying connectivity is responsible for producing the concreteness effect only when the subjects place an emphasis on verbally encoding the study items. Therefore, this instructional condition will allow us to test the Connectivity Hypothesis under conditions which emphasize verbal rather than imaginal encoding of the stimuli. Additionally, the instructions used in this experiment require subjects to relate the list items together in a meaningful way by forming sentences that contain two consecutive list items. In other words, these instructions encourage relational processing which, according to the R-D framework, is required for the concreteness effect to occur. Therefore, these instructions allow us to examine the possibility that the Connectivity Hypothesis is true when relational processing is present.
Again, three main effects were predicted, such that concrete words, words having small associative sets, and words that are high in connectivity were more likely to be recalled than abstract words, words having large associative sets, and words that are low in connectivity. The Connectivity Hypothesis predicts an interaction between connectivity and concreteness such that the concreteness effect should be more apparent when connectivity is high relative to when connectivity is low. PIER, on the other hand, assumes that the concreteness effect is a product of explicit processing, whereas the connectivity effect is a product of implicit processing. In the PIER model, these two representations are independent; therefore, these two effects are expected to be independent or additive in nature.
Method
Design. The experimental design formed a 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 mixed-model factorial. Concreteness (concrete or abstract words) was manipulated between subjects while target set size (small vs large) and connectivity (high vs low) were manipulated within subjects. The dependent variable was accuracy of cued recall performance.
Participants. Twenty subjects were randomly assigned to each between subjects condition, so that a total of 40 subjects participated in the experiment. Subject selection procedures were the same as those in the first experiment.
Materials. The test cues and their related targets are shown in Appendix B. All cues and targets were selected from the same database as the earlier experiment. Again, there were two abstract lists and two concrete lists which consisted of an equal number of target words with small or large associative sets and high or low connectivity. When pooled over lists, concreteness ratings averaged 5.65 (SD ϭ 0.58) for concrete words and 2.79 (SD ϭ 0.34) for abstract words; target set size averaged 6.46 (SD ϭ 1.44) for words with small sets of associates and 20.01 (SD ϭ 2.95) for words with large sets of associates; connectivity values averaged 0.63 (SD ϭ 0.38) for words with low levels of connectivity and 2.35 (SD ϭ 0.32) for words with high levels of connectivity.
The test cues that were used to prompt recall were also drawn from the same source and were selected based on their cue-to-target strength and meaning set size. When pooled over lists, the average cue-to-target strength was 0.18 (SD ϭ 0.03), the average cue set size was 14.23 (SD ϭ 3.04), and the average cue concreteness was 4.29 (SD ϭ 0.98). In general, these cues were moderately related to their targets, defined medium sets of associates, and were moderately concrete.
Again, as in Experiment 1, each of the relevant word characteristics were also controlled on a condition by condition basis. Concrete targets had an average set size of 13.10 (SD ϭ 7.33) and an average connectivity value of 1.53 (SD ϭ 1.02). Abstract targets had an average set size of 13.33 (SD ϭ 7.10) and an average connectivity value of 1.45 (SD ϭ 0.84). Low connectivity targets had an average concreteness rating of 4.42 (SD ϭ 1.48) and an average set size of 12.90 (SD ϭ 7.18). High connectivity targets had an average concreteness value of 4.33 (SD ϭ 1.55) and an average set size of 13.60 (SD ϭ 7.24). Small set size words had an average concreteness value of 4.21 (SD ϭ 1.45) and an average connectivity value of 1.50 (SD ϭ 0.88). Large set size words had an average concreteness value of 4.49 (SD ϭ 1.58) and an average connectivity value of 1.53 (SD ϭ 0.98).
Procedure. Again, as in Experiment 1, subjects were randomly assigned to one of the word lists and to one of the between subjects conditions, such that the experiment was conducted in randomized blocks. The procedure for testing subjects was the same as that in the previous experiment with the following exceptions: the experiment was conducted on a Macintosh Classic instead of using a slide projector and, instead of receiving the standard instructions or the rate imageability instructions at study, subjects were read verbal-relational instructions. These instructions directed subjects to make up a new sentence with the presentation of each study word. These sentences were to relate the current study word with the study word that immediately preceded it in the study list. The subjects were not required to say their sentences aloud, but were told that doing so would help them to remember as many words as possible. They were given an example sentence during the practice period and were allowed to practice making up a sentence of their own during the practice period. During the practice period, the experimenter also answered questions and generally helped the subjects to understand the instructions.
Results and Discussion
The cell means and standard deviations from this experiment are reported in Table 2 . A threeway mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on the data from this experiment, and effects due to concreteness (F(1,38) ϭ 21.63), target set size (F(1,38) ϭ 11.71), and connectivity (F(1,38) ϭ 8.34) were all reliable. Concrete words (M ϭ .62, SD ϭ .24) were recalled better than abstract words (M ϭ .40, SD ϭ .23), words with small sets of associates (M ϭ .56, SD ϭ .26) were recalled better than words with large sets of associates (M ϭ .45, SD ϭ .25), and words that had high levels of connectivity (M ϭ .55, SD ϭ .26) were recalled better than words with low levels of connectivity (M ϭ .46, SD ϭ .26).
The critical connectivity by concreteness interaction was not significant (F Ͻ 1.0). Again, although this interaction was not significant, the effect of concreteness was slightly larger in the low connectivity condition (concrete ϭ 0.58 vs abstract ϭ 0.36) than in the high connectivity condition (concrete ϭ 0.66 vs abstract ϭ 0.45). None of the other interactions in this experiment were significant (set size X concreteness F(1,38) ϭ 1.63, MSe ϭ 2.26, ns; all other F's Ͻ 1.0).
Again, these data suggest that the concreteness effect is independent of target set size and connectivity. The finding that target set size and concreteness have additive effects serves as a replication/extension of earlier work and the finding that connectivity and concreteness have additive and not interactive effects is consistent with predictions based on the PIER model and inconsistent with the Connectivity Hypothesis. Although the PIER model does not attempt to explain concreteness effects, it does assume that concreteness effects are a result of explicit processing, whereas connectivity effects are a result of implicit processing. Therefore, according to PIER, these effects are independent or additive in nature. The results of this experiment are consistent with the framework proposed by the PIER model; however, the concreteness effect itself continues to elude explanation. Further, these results demonstrate that the three main effects present in Experiment 1 (concreteness, connectivity, and set size) are generalizable to a new instructional manipulation as well as new experimental stimuli.
EXPERIMENT 3
The instructions used in Experiment 2 encouraged subjects to use relational processing at encoding which, according to the R-D framework, is necessary for the concreteness effect to occur. The concreteness effect was present in Experiment 2, but even under these conditions the Connectivity Hypothesis was not supported. If distinctive rather than relational processing is encouraged by the encoding instructions, then, according to the R-D framework, the concreteness effect should not occur. Thus, the goal of this experiment is twofold; to use a new set of instructions that encourage distinctive rather than relational processing which will allow us to evaluate the R-D framework and to examine the Connectivity Hypothesis under this new instructional manipulation.
The R-D framework predicts that the concreteness effect will not be present in this experiment, and the Connectivity Hypothesis predicts that the concreteness effect will be more apparent when connectivity is high relative to when connectivity is low. Predictions based on the PIER model are unchanged by manipulations of instructions, because instructions are assumed to affect the explicit rather than the implicit representation. PIER focuses on explaining effects related to the implicit representation, which is why it does not offer an explanation for concreteness effects it also assumes are a product of the explicit representation. Thus, PIER predicts three main effects (concreteness, connectivity, and set size), and concreteness should not interact with set size or with connectivity. Therefore, Experiment 3 was designed to examine the effect of an instructional condition that stresses distinctive processing. The instructions used here directed the subjects to form item-specific images. In other words, the subjects were directed to form mental images of the meaning of each study word as it appeared on the screen and then to "erase the image" when the next word appeared on the screen. Thus they formed one image after another and were not instructed to try to relate any of the images together. In fact, the subjects were discouraged from relating the images together by mentally "erasing" each image before forming the next mental image. Additionally, a practice phrase was included which required subjects to describe their mental images of practice items.
Method
Design. The experimental design formed a 2 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 mixed-model factorial. Concreteness (concrete or abstract words) was manipulated between subjects, while target set size (small vs large) and connectivity (high vs low) were manipulated within subjects.
Participants. Twenty subjects were randomly assigned to each between subjects condition, so that a total of 40 subjects participated in the experiment. Subject selection procedures were the same as those in the previous experiments.
Materials and procedure. The same word lists that were used in Experiment 2 were used again here. The procedure for testing subjects was the same as that in the previous experiments with the following exception. The instructions that were read to the subjects were item-specific imagery instructions. Under these instructions, subjects were directed to form an image of each study item as it appeared on the screen in front of them. They were also instructed to "erase their mental screen" and form a new image of the next word to appear. Additionally, subjects were given three practice items and asked to describe their mental image for the last practice item.
Results and Discussion
The cell means and standard deviations from this experiment are reported in Table 3 . A threeway mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on the data from this experiment and effects due to concreteness (F(1,38) ϭ 9.48), target set size (F(1,38) ϭ 9.86), and connectivity (F(1,38) ϭ 6.15) were all reliable. As in Experiments 1 and 2, concrete words (M ϭ .65, SD ϭ .24) were recalled better than abstract words (M ϭ .48, SD ϭ .25), words that defined a small set of associates (M ϭ .61, SD ϭ .25) were recalled better than words with large sets of associates (M ϭ .52, SD ϭ .25), and words that had high levels of connectivity (M ϭ .60, SD ϭ .24) were recalled better than words with low levels of connectivity (M ϭ .54, SD ϭ .26).
Again, as in Experiments 1 and 2, the critical connectivity by concreteness interaction was not significant (F Ͻ 1.0). The effect of concreteness in the low connectivity condition (concrete ϭ 0.61 vs abstract ϭ 0.47) was very similar to the effect in the high connectivity condition (concrete ϭ 0.69 vs abstract ϭ 0.51). In fact, as was the case in Experiment 2, none of the other interactions were significant (set size X concreteness, F(1,38) ϭ 2.75, MSe ϭ 5.26, ns; all other F's Ͻ 1.0).
Again, all of the main effects and none of the interactions involving concreteness were significant, which validates and extends the findings of Experiments 1 and 2 that the concreteness effect is independent of target set size and connectivity even when item-specific imagery is stressed at encoding. These results are consistent with the PIER framework, substantiating the claims made by regarding the independence of the target set size and concreteness effects. Additionally, the results presented here are inconsistent with the Connectivity Hypothesis, which predicted that concreteness and connectivity would result in an interaction. The results are inconsistent, however, with the R-D framework, which predicted that the concreteness effect would not be present in this experiment.
Additionally, these data are inconsistent with the Contextual Variety Hypothesis and the Perceptual Associates Hypothesis. According to , both of these approaches assume that the underlying network associative set size of the target is responsible for producing the concreteness effect. The Contextual Variety Hypothesis posits that concrete words have smaller sets of preexisting associates than abstract words, and the Perceptual Associates Hypothesis posits that concrete words have larger sets of preexisting associates than abstract words. Therefore, both of these approaches predict that target set size should interact with word concreteness, but and the results of Experiments 1-3 above have demonstrated that target concreteness and target set size have independent effects in the cued recall task. Therefore, the target set size variable was dropped from the following experiment.
EXPERIMENT 4
This experiment was designed to examine an instructional manipulation involving instructions which emphasized either relational or distinctive processing in the context of the same experiment. The R-D framework predicts that the concreteness effect will occur only in the presence of relational processing. According to Ruiz-Vargas et al. (1996) , a single list presentation, as in the extralist cued recall task, reduces or eliminates relational processing without which the concreteness effect should not occur. Therefore, the results of Experiments 1-3 are inconsistent with this framework, because in all cases subjects received a single list presentation. However, if we assume that relational processing can occur in the extralist task, then we must examine the extent to which the instructions encourage or discourage relational processing. Experiments 1-3 have not directly addressed this instructional manipulation issue in a single experimental setting. According to the R-D framework, the concreteness effect should be apparent only when subjects are using relational rather than distinctive processing. Therefore, the concreteness effect should not have been present in Experiment 3, where item-specific imagery was used, because subjects were specifically instructed not to relate one image to the next. In other words, it was assumed that the subjects were using distinctive processing in that condition. However, it is possible that the instructions used in Experiments 2 and 3 were not effective in encouraging the use of distinctive versus relational processing. Therefore, it is necessary to include an instructional manipulation in this experiment to determine if the instructions are effective. This will also provide another test of predictions based on PIER and the Connectivity Hypothesis under a new instructional manipulation.
It is interesting to note that the PIER model does not predict a specific ordering of the instructional conditions. PIER assumes that instructions impact the explicit representation, and PIER was developed almost exclusively for the purpose of explaining implicit processing. Generally, PIER assumes that the explicit representation is enhanced by intentional processing activities directed toward the study words, such as generating images. Therefore (as was the case in Experiment 1), PIER predicts that the instructional conditions that encourage the use of imagery should result in better performance than those conditions that do not.
Method
Design. The experimental design formed a 5 ϫ 2 ϫ 2 mixed-model factorial. Instructions (standard, item-specific imagery, image-relational, rate imageability, and verbal-relational) were manipulated between subjects, whereas concreteness (concrete vs abstract words) and connectivity (high vs low) were both manipulated within subjects.
Participants. Twenty subjects were randomly assigned to each between subjects condition, so that a total of 100 subjects participated in the experiment. All subjects were undergraduates in the introductory psychology courses at the State University of New York, College at Fredonia, and they received course credit for their participation.
Materials. Two new word lists were constructed for use in this experiment. Since set size was dropped from this experiment and concreteness and connectivity were manipulated within subjects, it was necessary to construct two instead of the four lists that were used in the previous experiments. The two lists were constructed in the same manner as were the lists used in Experiments 1-3. The cues and their corresponding targets appear in Appendix C. When pooled over lists, concreteness ratings averaged 5.78 (SD ϭ 0.68) for concrete words and 2.92 (SD ϭ 0.28) for abstract words; connectivity values averaged 0.69 (SD ϭ 0.21) for words with low levels of connectivity and 2.40 (SD ϭ 0.37) for words with high levels of connectivity. The average set size of the targets was 12.83 (SD ϭ 5.65).
The test cues that were used to prompt recall were also selected in the same manner as those cues used in Experiments 1-3. When pooled over lists, the average cue-to-target strength was 0.18 (SD ϭ 0.06), the average target-to-cue strength was 0.15 (SD ϭ 0.19), the average cue set size was 13.29 (SD ϭ 4.74), and the number of overlapping associates between the cue and the target was 1.58 (SD ϭ 1.03). In general, the cues were moderately related to their targets, the targets were moderately related to their cues, they defined medium sets of associates, and they had on average one or two overlapping associates with their targets.
Again, as in Experiments 1-3, each of the relevant word characteristics were also controlled on a condition by condition basis. Concrete targets had an average set size of 13.75 (SD ϭ 6.07) and an average connectivity value of 1.59 (SD ϭ 0.95). Abstract targets had an average set size of 11.92 (SD ϭ 5.15) and an average connectivity value of 1.50 (SD ϭ 0.90). Low connectivity targets had an average concreteness rating of 4.39 (SD ϭ 1.58) and an average set size of 11.25 (SD ϭ 5.07). High connectivity targets had an average concreteness value of 4.31 (SD ϭ 1.52) and an average set size of 14.42 (SD ϭ 5.85).
Procedure. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the two lists and one of the five instructional conditions, such that the experiment was conducted in randomized blocks. The procedure for testing subjects was the same as that in Experiments 1-3, with the following exceptions. The experiment was conducted on a Power Macintosh 7100/66 computer, and the instructions that were read to the subjects were the standard instructions or the rate imageability instructions (used in Experiment 1), the verbalrelational instructions (used in Experiment 2), item-specific imagery instructions (used in Experiment 3), or image-relational instructions. The image-relational instructions directed the subjects to form an image of the meaning of each item as it appeared on the computer screen. When the next word appeared, the subjects task was to form a mental image of that word and link it to the image of the word that immediately preceded it in the list. For example, if subjects first saw the word LAMP, they were to form an image of a LAMP. The next word may be BOOK. The subjects were instructed to link the two images in some meaningful way. For example, they could form an image of a book sitting on a lamp. During the explanation of the instructions, subjects were encouraged to ask questions, and they were prompted to produce their own examples relevant to their instructional condition.
Results and Discussion
The cell means and standard deviations from this experiment are reported in Table 4 . A threeway mixed-model ANOVA was conducted on the data from this experiment, and effects due to concreteness (F(1,95) ϭ 100.43), connectivity (F(1,95) ϭ 4.51), and type of instruction (F(4,95) ϭ 4.43) were all reliable. As in Experiments 1 through 3, concrete words (M ϭ .64, SD ϭ .21) were recalled at a higher rate than abstract words (M ϭ .43, SD ϭ .21), and words that are high in connectivity (M ϭ .55, SD ϭ .24) were recalled at a higher rate than words that are low in connectivity (M ϭ .52, SD ϭ .21).
As in the previous three experiments, the main effects for concreteness and connectivity were significant, whereas the critical interaction between the two variables was not, F(1,95) ϭ 2.93, MSe ϭ 0.98, ns. Although the interaction was nonsignificant, there was a very slight trend in the direction predicted by the Connectivity Hypothesis. When connectivity was high, the concreteness effect was slightly larger (concrete: 0.67 vs abstract: 0.43) than when connectivity was low (concrete: 0.61 vs abstract: 0.43). A power analysis (using the within cell standard deviation of 1.23 in this experiment and an N of 100) revealed that, with any effect size of 0.47 or greater, the power in this experimental design was a perfect 1.00. You will recall that, according to Cohen's standards, an effect size of 0.50 is considered moderate (0.80 is large and 0.20 is small). Therefore, it appears that there was suf- ficient power in this experimental design to detect the presence of an interaction if it were real. Additionally, given that the concreteness main effect represented a 21% difference in recall of concrete (0.64) vs abstract (0.43) targets and that the effect size of the concreteness main effect was a remarkable 1.0, it is not reasonable to suspect that connectivity, whose effect size in this experiment was a weak 0.14, could underlie the concreteness effect as predicted by the Connectivity Hypothesis. It is also interesting to note that the experimental design had sufficient power to detect the presence of the connectivity effect even though its effect size was very small.
Again, these findings validate and extend the findings of Experiments 1 through 3 that concreteness and connectivity have additive effects in cued recall using a different set of experimental stimuli under several different instructional conditions. These data are again consistent with the PIER framework and inconsistent with predictions based on the Connectivity Hypothesis.
It is interesting to note that although the connectivity effect was significant in this experiment, it was only a 3% effect compared with 7% in Experiment 1, 9% in Experiment 2, and 6% in Experiment 3. In each of those earlier experiments, target set size was manipulated (which ensured that half of the targets had small associative sets), whereas here target set size was held constant at a medium level (M ϭ 12.85). There appears to be a weak relationship between target set size and connectivity such that the connectivity effect is more pronounced when target set size is small. You will recall that this interaction was reliable in Experiment 1, but not in Experiments 2 and 3. Using the normative database described earlier, we calculated the correlation between connectivity and target set size. Based on a sample of 3285 words, the correlation was r ϭ .22. There does appear to be a relationship between these two variables.
1 By holding target set size constant at a medium level, we may have been truncating the effect of connectivity. However, the connectivity effect was reliable in this experiment, which indicates that connectivity is not simply another measure of target set size.
The main effect of instruction was subjected to a Fisher's LSD (LSD ϭ .078) posthoc test, which revealed that the rate imageability (M ϭ .62, SD ϭ .22) condition resulted in significantly higher levels of recall than the standard (M ϭ .51, SD ϭ .21), the image-relational (M ϭ .52, SD ϭ .25), or the verbal-relational (M ϭ .47, SD ϭ .25) instructional conditions. Additionally, the item-specific imagery (M ϭ .55, SD ϭ .20) condition resulted in significantly higher performance than the verbal-relational condition. No other mean differences reached significance. Nor were any other effects significant in this experiment (concreteness ϫ instruction, F(4,95) ϭ 1.27, MSe ϭ 1.61, ns; connectivity ϫ instruction, F(4,95) ϭ 2.20, MSe ϭ 0.98, ns; concreteness ϫ connectivity ϫ instruction, F(4,95) ϭ 2.45, MSe ϭ 0.98, ns).
It appears that the instructions did impact the way in which the subjects were encoding the stimuli. Generally, most of the conditions requiring some sort of imagery resulted in superior performance overall when compared with instructions that required subjects to form sentences at study. It is noteworthy that instructions did not interact with the concreteness effect. According to the R-D framework, the concreteness effect should have only been present under conditions involving relational processing, but the effect should have been eliminated when relational processing was absent. Therefore, according to this framework, the concreteness effect should have been present in the imagerelational and verbal-relational conditions, but absent in the item-specific imagery condition, but this was not the case.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This series of experiments has consistently demonstrated that the effects of target concreteness and target connectivity have additive ef-fects on extralist cued recall. These effects have been demonstrated in four different experiments, over three different sets of stimuli, five different types of instructions, and two different subject pools in two different states. The variables did not result in an interaction in any of the experiments reported here, but consistently resulted in main effects. Although it is somewhat problematic to do so, Fig. 2 displays the combined mean proportions of correct recall across all four experiments for each of the four nonsignificant concreteness by connectivity interactions. Keep in mind that this figure represents collapsed data across different encoding conditions and in Experiments 1-3 concreteness was manipulated between subjects, whereas in Experiment 4 it was manipulated within subjects. The figure does show an interesting overall pattern in the data that these two variables do not appear to interact. Therefore, it appears that the Connectivity Hypothesis, which posits that the concreteness effect is the result of underlying target connectivity, is incorrect. It does, however, appear that the framework proposed by the PIER model is supported by the data.
According to PIER, concreteness effects are produced as a result of the influence of the explicit processing component, whereas connectivity and set size effects are produced as a result of the influence of the implicit processing component. These two components of processing are assumed to be functionally independent of one another, and thus effects related to each component should also be independent. In each of the four experiments, the concreteness effect was independent of connectivity and set size effects. Additionally, only in Experiment 1 did two variables interact and both of those variables (set size and connectivity) are assumed to result from the implicit component; thus, an interaction in this case is still consistent with the PIER model. However, it is worth reiterating that the interaction between set size and connectivity, although consistent with the PIER model, appears to be an unstable and weak effect. The fact that this interaction was present in Experiment 1, but not apparent in Experiments 2 and 3, provides evidence to substantiate this claim. Future research may explore this issue, but that was not a goal for this project.
The argument could be made that the evidence against the Connectivity Hypothesis rests upon a null result. However, the fact that main effects were found for both variables in all four experiments indicates that the experimental paradigm was sensitive to the effects of the variables. Therefore, if an interaction truly exists between these variables, the probability is that it should have been apparent in at least one of the experiments reported above, but it was not. The power analyses reported above indicated that there was enough power in the experimental designs to detect the presence of an interaction if it were real. Given that the concreteness effect is a very large effect (effect size of 1.0 in Experiment 4), whereas the connectivity effect is a small effect (effect size of 0.14 in Experiment 4), it is not reasonable to assume that connectivity could underlie the concreteness effect.
The possibility that concreteness effects are produced by underlying connectivity would indicate that, in the experiments reported by Nelson and Schreiber (1992), target concreteness would have to have been consistently confounded with connectivity, such that concrete words had higher levels of connectivity than abstract words. In order to examine this possible confound, the connectivity value for each item in each of their experiments was found in the Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber (1994) database. The results revealed the following connectivity values: In Experiment 1 mean connectivity for the concrete words was 1.37 (SD ϭ .54) and for abstract words it was 1.47 (SD ϭ .59); in Experiment 2 mean connectivity for concrete words was 1.36 (SD ϭ .60) and for abstract words it was 1.34 (SD ϭ .52); in Experiment 3 mean connectivity for concrete words was 1.56 (SD ϭ .87) and for abstract words it was 1.50 (SD ϭ .73). Averaging across all three experiments, concrete words had a mean of 1.43 and abstract words had a mean connectivity value of 1.44. Thus, it is clear that did not confound connectivity with concreteness in their experiments.
Additionally, reported the results of a correlational study of word attributes based on 2172 words, which indicated that the correlation between connectivity and concreteness was r ϭ .00. We have recalculated this correlation based on 3285 words and the correlation between these two variables is very similar, r ϭ .03. Therefore, there exists very consistent evidence that connectivity and concreteness do represent independent word attributes.
The evidence presented here and elsewhere indicates that the entire class of structural explanations are incorrect. The evidence presented above eliminates the Connectivity Hypothesis. argued that both the Contextual Variety Hypothesis (Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983 ) and the Perceptual Associates Hypothesis (de Groot, 1989) suggest that the underlying associative set size of the target is responsible for producing the concreteness effect. However, demonstrated that the associative set size of the target and concreteness have independent effects on cued recall performance. Their data are inconsistent with both the Contextual Variety Hypothesis and the Perceptual Associates Hypothesis. Additionally, Experiments 1 through 3, presented here, provide three replications of their basic findings that target concreteness and target set size have additive, not interactive, effects.
One of the process theories, the R-D framework (Marschark & Hunt, 1989) , also offers an explanation of concreteness effects, but the data presented here are also inconsistent with this approach. First, the R-D framework predicts that the concreteness effect will not occur in the extralist cued recall task because the task reduces or eliminates access to relational information (Ruiz-Vargas et al., 1996) . The four experiments presented here and the results of Ruiz-Vargas et al. (1996) provide evidence that the effect does occur consistently in this task. Second, the R-D framework predicts that the concreteness effect will be present under conditions that require relational processing but absent when subjects are not using relational processing. Thus, the R-D framework would predict the absence of a concreteness effect in Experiment 3, where Item-Specific Imagery was used, because the instructions stressed that the subjects should not relate their images to one another at study. However, the concreteness effect was present in that study. It is possible that the instructional manipulation was not powerful enough to alter the way the subjects were encoding the material at study in that experiment. In other words, the subjects may have been using relational processing in that experiment. Therefore, the effect of type of instruction was examined in Experiment 4 and was found to be reliable. In that experiment, the R-D framework would predict the presence of an interaction between concreteness and type of instructions such that the concreteness effect should be present when relational processing was required by the instructions (e.g., Image-Relational and Verbal-Relational conditions), but the concreteness effect should not be present when distinctive, rather than relational, processing was required by the instructions (ItemSpecific Imagery). This interaction was not reliable, nor did it approach significance in that experiment. In fact, counterevidence was present in that experiment. The Item-Specific Imagery instructions, which discourage relational processing but encourage distinctive processing, resulted in better performance than the Verbal-Relational instructions, which encourage relational processing.
Thus, it appears that the R-D framework has met with little success in explaining the data presented here.
Although the R-D framework cannot explain the data presented here, the other processing theory described earlier, DCT (Paivio, 1971) , can explain the data. According to DCT, there are two distinct coding systems; a nonverbal or imaginal code and a verbal or linguistic code. Abstract words are assumed to be stored in only the verbal code, because they are more difficult to imagine, whereas concrete words are stored in both codes, because they are readily imagined. DCT assumes that concrete words have a relative advantage over abstract words at retrieval because of the availability of their two distinct codes relative to only one code for abstract words. Thus, DCT predicts that the concreteness effect will occur in all situations; the effect was reliable in all four experiments presented above. However, other evidence suggests that the concreteness effect does not occur when materials are integrated with conceptually related material (e.g., Bransford & Johnson, 1972; Bransford & McCarrell, 1974; Pezdek & Royer, 1974) . Additionally, recently Paivio (1991) has described one interpretation of DCT that includes the basic assumptions of the R-D framework. This indicates that this new interpretation of DCT, like the R-D framework, cannot explain the presence of the concreteness effect in Experiment 2 or the lack of an interaction between concreteness and type of instruction in Experiment 4.
The data presented in these four experiments indicate that the underlying associative set size and the degree to which the associates of that set are highly or more sparsely interconnected are apparently not responsible for producing the concreteness effect. Combined with the results of , the data presented here provide strong evidence that the underlying associative structure is not involved in producing the concreteness effect. One of the most robust memory phenomena in the literature, the concreteness effect, continues to elude explanation; however, this series of experiments tells us more about what it is not. Target   ACCOUNT  BANK  HEEL  TOE  BELT  BUCKLE  SAW  HAMMER  LATE  NIGHT  STORM  CLOUD  SHAKE  RATTLE  WASP  BEE  SPIDER  WEB  WATCH  CLOCK  THUMB  NAIL  WEIGHT  SCALES  APOSTLE  BIBLE  ADULT  PARENT  BOAT  SAIL  GOAL  SOCCER  FINAL  EXAM  LUNCH  DINNER  KNIT  NEEDLE  PADDLE  OAR  RAT  RODENT  STINK  SKUNK  SMELL  ODOR  THIMBLE  NEEDLE  CABINET  KITCHEN  BARRACUDA  SHARK  CELL  BLOOD  CRATER  HOLE  COMB  HAIR  HIP  BONE  DONKEY  HORSE  LIMB  TREE  GOAT  MILK  MELT  ICE  HOTEL  ROOM  YARD  FENCE  BLUE  GREEN  BANANA  YELLOW  CHERRY  PIE  BEEF  STEAK  CORK  BOTTLE  CELL  PRISON  HELMET  FOOTBALL  CONTAINER  BOWL  MUG  BEER  HAT  COAT  NEURON  BRAIN  POCKET  PANTS a Starting with the first set of six targets, the words are classified as having small sets of associates and low levels of connectivity, small sets and high levels of connectivity, large sets and low connectivity, and finally large sets and high connectivity. Target   CARRIAGE BABY  BUGGY  CAR  TURKEY  HAM  CORK  BOTTLE  FLANNEL  SHIRT  NOODLES  SOUP  BANANA  YELLOW  BIRTHDAY  CAKE  SHOVEL  DIRT  SCALPEL  DOCTOR  PILL  MEDICINE  OFFICE  DESK  DISASTER EARTHQUAKE CONCRETE  SOLID  COTTAGE  CHEESE  COWBOY  INDIAN  DUNGEON DRAGON  FRILL  LACE  SECURITY POLICE  FRIEND  ENEMY  TRAILER  PARK  MONGOOSE  SNAKE  SINGER  DANCER  WIRE  TELEPHONE  TWIST  SHOUT  BARRIER  REEF  SHAVE  RAZOR  GOAL  SOCCER  DRIP  FAUCET  DIRTY  FILTHY  HOLY  BIBLE  LADY  WOMAN  MUSK  SCENT  FRIAR  MONK  BUG  INSECT  CONSTABLE SHERIFF  LEOPARD  CAT  COLLAR  DOG  BUDDY  PAL  VAULT  BANK  TEST  QUIZ  WEIGH  SCALES  BUM  HOBO  WRIST  ARM  MONTH  DAY  SHOE  SOCK  ROUND  CIRCLE  BRUSH  COMB a Starting with the first set of six targets, the words are classified as having large sets of associates and high levels of connectivity, large sets and low levels of connectivity, small sets and high connectivity, and finally small sets and low connectivity. a Starting with the first set of six targets, the words are classified as concrete with high levels of connectivity, concrete with low levels of connectivity, abstract with high connectivity, and finally abstract with low connectivity.
